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 ABSTRACT
The present essay is devoted to analyzing Reinhold’s contribution to one of the most rel-
evant questions in German idealism, namely, the possibility of an absolute principle of all 
philosophy, as a task left open by Kant’s critical enterprise. The main aim is to assess the 
extent to which Reinhold is the first to propose this philosophical problem as a question of 
language, and in doing so the possibility of an absolutely apodictic philosophical language, 
as it would be later resumed and developed by Fichte and other authors.
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RESUMO
O presente artigo propõe-se analisar o contributo de Reinhold para uma das mais relevan-
tes questões do período do Idealismo Alemão, a saber, a possibilidade de um princípio 
absoluto de toda a filosofia, enquanto tarefa deixada em aberto pela empresa crítica de 
Kant. O principal objectivo é avaliar até que ponto Reinhold é o primeiro a propor este 
problema filosófico enquanto uma questão de linguagem, e, ao fazê-lo, propor também 
a possibilidade de uma linguagem filosófica absolutamente apodíctica, tal como ela seria 
posteriormente reatada por Fichte e outros autores.
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2 Kant himself acknowledges 
this, and shows himself forever in 
Reinhold’s debt for it. Referring to 
Reinhold, in “On the use of teleo-
logical principles in philosophy”, 
in 1788, Kant says: “The talent of 
a lucid, even graceful presentation 
of dry abstract doctrines, without 
loss of their thoroughness, is so 
rare […] and yet so useful, I will not 
say only for the recommendation, 
but even for the clarity of insight, 
the intelligibility and the conviction 
associated with it, that I consider 
myself obliged to pay thanks pub-
licly to the man who supplemented 
my works […]” (AA 8: 183).
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It is widely acknowledged that Karl Leonhard Reinhold is not only one of the main popular-
izers of Kant’s philosophy, but also and above all one of the most sagacious and faithful supporters 
of Kant’s system of thought.2 
Kant, Reinhold said, was his master, and the goal of his theory was mainly to complement 
and perfect Kant’s, which Reinhold considered as not only correct, but, more importantly, the only 
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possible for the present age. So it had been prior to 1790, when, 
since the publication of the second Critique, the problem of 
Kant’s philosophy progressively fermented in the Tübinger 
Stift, thus setting Tübingen’s orthodoxy against Kant and 
Reinhold himself; so it would be in the following years, when, 
under the influence of Reinhold’s writings, the problem of re-
ligion would be accentuated in Tübingen3 and transferred to 
Jena as a problem of philosophy and language (for, in truth, the 
point in discussion was the authority of concepts in the true 
cognition and designation of objects); and so it would be until 
the decisive influence of Immanuel Carl Diez4 and the later 
outbreak of Fichte’s philosophy, the two main factors why 
Reinhold, in his own words, would have to “destroy [his] ele-
mentary philosophy”5. And even though, at times, the course 
of Reinhold’s reflection may seem to separate him from Kant, 
however, this only served the purpose of ultimately reuniting 
both theories all the more fraternally; a conciliatory factor 
very true to Reinhold’s chara er, which has perhaps contrib-
uted to the unjust notion that Reinhold’s philosophy is but a 
faint echo of Kant’s6, and to the even more unjust neglect of 
the importance of his work not only for Kant’s philosophy, 
but for a whole generation of young philosophers7. 
Now, this trait of theoretical loyalty surely defines not 
only the course of Reinhold’s philosophy, but also the very im-
age of his reflection, which is why it is assumed by Reinhold 
as the horizon of his philosophy. However, there is at least one 
moment in the course of Reinhold’s philosophy that reflects 
a deliberate separation from Kant’s philosophy: a moment 
which is one of deliberate accentuation, if not of radicaliza-
tion of the critical enterprise, and which, for that reason, dis-
plays a will to overcome Kant’s philosophy. One such moment 
takes place in the work Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger 
Miβverständnisse der Philosophen, in 1790; the second of 
three works where Reinhold defines his position with regard 
to the problem8, but perhaps the one containing the funda-
mental vectors of Reinhold’s theory, and surely the only one 
displaying precisely that which renders him a unique thinker: 
his argument on Kant’s philosophy not only as a problem of phi-
losophy, but also as a problem of language: in a word, the factor 
which presents said conflicts to the philosophical community 
of the time and decisively propels the philosophies of Fichte 
and the young idealists. 
The aim of the present essay is therefore to address the 
aforementioned moment and, by analyzing the Beiträge, at-
tempt not only to underscore the singularity of Reinhold’s phi-
losophy, thus rescuing it from the apparent indifference into 
which it has fallen, but also to discern Reinhold’s image as a 
keystone in one of the main problems of German idealism: 
namely, the problem of the destination of philosophy as a field 
of knowledge. 
Additionally, the essay has two further objectives:
(i)  To show that, after Kant, Reinhold was the first to 
elevate philosophy to the condition of a problem of 
reason, which he did due to the necessity to render 
philosophy systematic, obedient to a single absolute 
principle and therefore scientific;
(ii)  To prove that Reinhold was one of the few to con-
sider this problem as a problem of language, and the 
one to show the philosophical community of his time 
that the main, perhaps most arduous difficulty in 
Kant’s philosophy was in understanding the aspira-
tions that Kant had placed in its language, and not so 
much in the height that his philosophical edifice had 
attained; which precisely proved Kant’s irrefutable 
importance as a thinker of language through the lan-
guage of philosophy itself, and how that would come 
to transform the very face of philosophy in general.
The Beiträge occupy a central position not only in Rein-
hold’s work, but also in his line of thought, and, as was said, their 
tendency shows as much of a theoretical advance in relation to 
the Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie (2015 [1790-1792]), the 
“Abhandlung über das Bedürfnis einer neuen Untersuchung 
des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens” (Reinhold, 1789 
[1976]), or the “Fragmente über das bisher allgemein verkan-
nte Vorstellungs-Vermögen” (Reinhold, 1789b, p. 3-22), as it is 
a sign of what was to be consolidated shortly afterwards, in the 
Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791). 
3 A reference to the work of supernaturalists such as G.C. Storr, J.F. Flatt or F.G. Süβkind, Theology professors at Tübingen, to whom 
the truths of the genuine Christian doctrine were irrefutable truths, visible not only beyond, but precisely independently from reason, 
in revelation.
4 On the influence of Immanuel Carl Diez, Professor at Tübingen, on Reinhold, see Henrich (2004); Frank (1998), and Diez (1966). 
5 See Reinhold’s letter to Baggesen, 3rd of February 1797, in Fuchs et al. (1978, p. 403): “Es ist meine heiligste, dringendste Pflicht, die 
Elementarphilosophie selbst einzustürzen, aus ihren brauchbaren Trümmern eine Sacristei für den Tempel der reinen Vernunft zu errich-
ten, den Fichte begründet hat – laut – laut zu sagen daβ ich diese Begründung anerkenne […].”
6 Despite the general neglect of Reinhold, there are notable exceptions to this, such as Henrich (1989, 2004); Frank (1998); Bondeli 
(1995); Bondeli and Schrader (2003); Lauth (1974); Klemmt (1958).
7 Reinhold lectured on Philosophy in Jena between 1787 and 1794, and due to his quarrel with the Tübingen theologians, his influence 
was felt at the Stift as well. As a Professor in Jena, he had such notable students as J.P.A. Feuerbach, J.B. Erhard, C.L. Fernow, Novalis, 
F.I. Niethammer or F.K. Forberg (on Reinhold’s [positive] influence on his students, see Forberg, “Über die bisherigen Schicksale der 
Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens”, in “Fülleborn’s Beyträgen zur Geschichte der Philosophie”, St. 1, 1791, p. 91-113); as an influence 
in Tübingen, he was read by many future philosophers, among whom Hölderlin, Hegel and Schelling (not to forget that one of Schell-
ing’s two lost specimina was entitled “Über die Möglichkeit einer Philosophie ohne Beinamen, nebst einigen Bemerkungen über die 
Reinholdsche Elementarphilosophie”). On the theme, see Fabianelli (2003).
8 The other two were Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie (1786) and Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791).
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The fundamental idea that emerges from the work 
and presides over Reinhold’s thought is, in a way, akin to 
the one which would preside over the later philosophies 
of Fichte and Schelling, namely, that philosophy lacked 
a fundamental ground, a “first and universally accepted 
principle of all philosophy” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 3) which 
united its theoretical and pra ical parts. For Kant’s philos-
ophy, and philosophy in general, Reinhold thought, were 
becoming more and more divided due to the abusive mis-
interpretation of its domain and language by the different 
philosophical sects growing around it. The absence of one 
such regulating principle not only concealed the horizon of 
man’s knowledge from his sight (thus leading him to be-
lieve that this horizon was more or less ample than it re-
ally was), but also legitimated the belief that the progress 
towards that point in knowledge – that is, the possibility 
of a critical language, the suppression of all doubt through 
language – could be attained without the aid of reason: 
which, in turn, only encouraged the pretensions of those 
who defended common understanding as one such vehicle. 
But even more ominous to Kant’s critical endeavor, the lan-
guage and form of philosophy “drew away from the form of 
rigorous science […]”,  instead “assuming […] the form of 
history”,9 where chance and the contingency of life precede 
the scientific ground, and scientific laws are elevated to the 
condition of “universally valid” (“allgemeingültig”), but not 
“universally accepted” (“allgemeingeltend”) laws10; which not 
only prevented the acquisition of an absolute principle, but 
cast a shadow of doubt over the whole problem. 
Hence, to Reinhold, peace between philosophical sects 
presupposed not only identifying that which united them in 
their objection to Kantian purism, but also rectifying what 
was inconsistent with their language. In a word, the aim was 
to oppose these sects’ obstinacy in stating the impossibility 
of a single principle of philosophy, thus protecting the criti-
cal edifice from such attacks and gathering the different sects 
around a single critical language; under pain of forever ne-
glecting the regulative enterprise of reason and consigning it 
to a constitutive and heteronomic progress. 
According to Reinhold, the primary cause of this prob-
lem has a double origin, both of a philosophical nature. Rein-
hold refers to one of them in the Preface to Versuch einer 
neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, in 1789, 
entitled “Vorrede ueber die bisherigen Schicksale der kanti-
schen Philosophie” (Reinhold, 1789, p. 1-68). The first one 
is the reformulation of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophical 
system, which, though still unconcluded, had expanded too 
quickly throughout the philosophical community, thus cre-
ating a phenomenon of popularization of philosophy11, as well 
as “the fall of the ancient […] division wall between world 
and school”.12 It was this di ersion that resulted in the frag-
mentation of the philosophical community: a process which 
reached its peak during Reinhold’s stay in Jena, by 1790; more 
precisely, in the dialogue between Reinhold and the Tübingen 
theologians, the skeptics and the Kantian orthodoxies, the 
aforementioned philosophical sects, which by refuting Kant 
only accentuated their incomprehension of the Professor of 
Königsberg and thus contributed to an even greater dissemi-
nation of different fa ions (and the subsequent proliferation 
of different languages) within philosophy. 
The second origin of this problem is more complex. It 
is presented at the beginning of a chapter in the first volume 
of the Beiträge, bearing the title “Verhältnis der Theorie des 
Vorstellungsvermögens zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft”. In 
this chapter, Reinhold’s aim is to further the aforementioned 
issue, and this he does by explaining that the problems arising 
from the inexistence of an absolute principle of all philosophy 
should be attributed not only to the exacerbation they had 
suffered at the hands of the sects, but also to the insufficien-
cy of Kant’s theory. For though with regard to the faculty of 
knowledge – that is, the acquisition of the forms of intuitions, 
concepts and ideas – Kant’s theory was to Reinhold incontro-
vertible, which explains why Reinhold’s aim could never be 
to surpass Kant, rather to attain his master’s results through a 
different path13, however, in a deeper regard, namely, the degree 
of concord of all knowledge with a single absolute principle, 
Kant had left his enterprise unfinished.14 The reason for this 
was obvious to Reinhold and similar to the ones later con-
9 See Reinhold (1789a [1796], p. 10), “In den Lehrbüchern nahm die Philosophie in eben dem Verhältnisse die Form der Geschichte an, 
als sie sich von der Form der strengen Wissenschaft entfernete”.
10 “Es muβ ein allgemeingeltender Satz als erster Grundsatz möglich sein, oder die Philosophie ist als Wissenschaft unmöglich [...]” 
(Reinhold, 2003, p. 248).
11 “Noch nie hat ein philosophisches System eine so schnelle und so allgemeine Aufnahme gefunden, als das Leibnitzisch-wolfische. [...] 
Allein eben darum und fast eben so bald verloren die wesentlicheren Grundsätze dieser allgemein beliebten Philosophie den Reiz der 
Neuheit. Sie erhielten durch ihren vielfältigen Gebrauch die Popularität gemeiner und alltäglicher Maximen [...]” (Reinhold, 1789, p. 3-4)
12 “Ein Zusammenfluβ günstiger Umstände, deren Aufzählung nicht hieher gehört, schien den Einsturz der alten leidigen Scheidewand 
zwischen Welt und Schule vollendet zu haben [...]” (Reinhold, 1789, p. 4-5).
13 “[...] So stellt er [die Zurückführung der Hauptmomente der kr. Philosophie auf einen allgemeingeltenden Grund] die ganze kritische 
Elementarphilosophie unabhängig von den Gründen, auf welchen sie in der Kr. d. r. V. feststeht, von neuem auf; und dient, da er auf 
einem ganz verschiedenen Wege zu eben denselben Resultaten führt, den Kantischen Entdeckungen, als eine den Rechnungsproben 
ähnliche Bestätigung” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 184).
14 “Daβ die Formen der Vorstellungen, so wie sie in der Kritik d. V. aufgestellt werden, auf keinen allgemeingeltenden Grundsatz zurückge-
führt sind; und daβ in diesem Werke von keinem ersten Grundsatze der Wissenschaft des Erkenntnisvermögens, noch weniger von einem 
ersten Grundsatze der Philosophie überhaupt, die Rede sei, welcher die Elementarphilosophie unmittelbar und durch dieselbe die von 
ihr abgeleitete theoretische und praktische Philosophie mittelbar begründen soll, weiβ jeder Leser derselben” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 185).
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veyed by Fichte or Schelling: Kant had indeed indicated an 
absolute principle of philosophy, but had not elevated it to that 
condition, had not realized it; that is, he had not consolidated 
it conceptually, nor had he consigned it to the perpetuity of 
words. But because the possibility of that first principle was 
undeniable and its realization, as the main task of philosophy 
in general, all the more necessary, then the task of resuming 
Kant’s endeavor could only mean to Reinhold taking one step 
further towards the consolidation of the language of that princi-
ple, thus fulfilling the aforementioned omissions and once and 
for all instituting philosophy in the field of science.
Reinhold had already started developing this twofold 
effort earlier, in the aforementioned text which served as in-
troduction to the Versuch, in 1789. The text, as noted earlier, 
was entitled: “Über die bisherigen Schicksale der kantischen 
Philosophie”. The topic here is, quite  ecifically, the procedure 
of Kant’s philosophy. 
Hence, according to Reinhold, while seeking to render 
his principles universally accepted (absolute), Kant had been 
forced to choose a singular path, different from that of pop-
ular philosophers: “instead of determining the nature and 
reach of the faculty of knowledge by means of known ob-
jects, he [Kant] had had to determine the cognizability of ob-
jects themselves by means of the pure faculty of knowledge” 
(Reinhold, 1789, p. 46). That is, “instead of […] descending 
from universal to particular” (from the infinite to the finite, 
that is, from the faculty of knowledge in general to known 
objects), “Kant had had to ascend”15 from the particular to 
the universal, from the objects themselves to the pure facul-
ty of knowledge. But in doing so – and this is to Reinhold 
the most relevant – only apparently had Kant only ascended 
from a common particular to a common universal; for, to 
Kant, neither is the pure faculty of knowledge just a com-
mon universal, nor is the object thus subsumed just a com-
mon particular. Quite on the contrary, Kant had turned the 
most infinite that philosophy possessed, the pure faculty of 
knowing, into its own finite, its own particular instance – and 
only then, through this veiled inversion, did he elevate himself 
to the universal, which, in this per ective, is the infinite of 
known objects, the very cognizability of objects, “the boundary 
of everything conceivable”16. In other words, Kant has operat-
ed a methodological twist between particular and universal, 
ascent and descent through which he attained a reflexive cir-
cle between contraries17 which, to any philosopher who did 
not understand the singular nuance of this analytical method, 
would be but a mere transition from the finite to the infinite 
and therefore a “vertigo”18 in which philosophy was always 
entangled. Yet to Reinhold, what Kant had thus accomplished 
was no less than the boldest and most illuminating progress of 
philosophy: the reflexive mobile of a whole generation, which 
inverted not the elements that compose the philosophical 
analysis, but the very direction, the very language of the analy-
sis itself, thus pre-consummating the form of philosophy and 
fulfilling Kant’s prerogatives on the impossibility of an endless 
progression or on the presupposition of an ideal.   
Now, to Reinhold, this unique process surely meant the 
most complete development of the faculty of knowledge; but de-
spite this faculty’s infallibility, which is visible in the way how 
the universal is identified with the particular, an instance was 
still missing. Namely, an instance proving that just as the uni-
versal may freely assume the form of the particular, the par-
ticular too is nothing but the dismembered universal; in other 
words, something that could unite both ends of the invisible 
beam that connects philosophy (the voice of the human spir-
it) and the human spirit itself (the ample echo box of philoso-
phy), so that, in the presence of philosophy, the human spirit 
could spontaneously discern or rediscover itself and its mute 
language. For, on the one hand, only this absolute apodicticity, 
this veiled language between the spirit and its most privileged 
form of expression may serve as proof for the existence of an 
absolute principle; and, on the other hand, only this absolute 
principle may prove, in the eyes of philosophy and the spirit, 
that the particular is universal, and vice versa, or, in Reinhold’s 
words, that the “true premises of a science may be discovered 
only after science itself ”19: an inverse, yet complementary or-
der of things, which is a direct consequence of the analytical 
course as the natural progress of the human spirit.     
In a word, Reinhold states, though he identified the par-
ticular with the universal, thus defining the forms of intuitions, 
concepts and ideas as elements of knowledge, Kant had not 
succeeded in discerning among the latter a form other than the 
cognizable (which, Reinhold says, only proves that Kant did 
not think the possibility of a different connecting element be-
tween the voices of philosophy and the human spirit). Hence, 
by indicating the original premises of the faculty of knowledge 
and by particularizing the universal and uniting cognizability 
to the finite, Kant had no doubt ensured that cognizability be-
came universal (in language), but not that this form of thinking 
was redirected to a higher authority, to a more elementary form of 
knowledge and language, in a word, to a higher degree of cer-
15 “Anstatt des leichten […] Herabsteigens vom Allgemeinen zum Besondern, vom Abstracten zum Concreten [...], müβte er [...] das 
mühsamere und langweiligere Hinaufsteigen wählen [...]” (Reinhold, 1789a [1796], p. 23-24).
16 “[...] das heiβt, das allgemeinste was die bisherige Philosophie aufzuweisen hat, müβte ihm das Besondere werden, von dem er sich zu 
dem Allgemeinern bis an die Gränze alles Begreiflichen erheben müβte [...]” (Reinhold, 1789a [1796], p. 24).
17 A circle according to which the minimum of finitude is infinitude, the minimum of infinitude is finitude.
18 “Wie sollte ihm der Populärphilosoph ohne Schwindel folgen können?” (Reinhold, 1789a [1796], p. 24).
19 “Daβ die eigentlichen Prämissen einer Wissenschaft erst nach der Wissenschaft selbst gefunden werden ist nichts neues, sondern eine 
nothwendige Folge des analytischen Ganges, der den Fortschritten des menschlichen Geistes durch die Natur desselben vorgeschrie-
ben ist” (Reinhold, 1789a [1796], p. 67).
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tainty which would prove it spontaneously and apodictically 
in view of the human spirit – to Reinhold, the act of represent-
ing. And it was precisely this, to Reinhold and later to Fichte, 
which promoted the chasm between theoretical and pra ical 
and, in the absence of a principle previous to the faculty of 
knowledge, rendered the critical edifice incomplete.
Quite naturally, the results of this non-distinction be-
tween cognition and a higher authority would have different 
repercussions in the scrutiny of the pretensions of human 
knowledge; and, of course, according to Reinhold, they would 
also arise in the guise of various inconsistencies. 
One of these, however, concerned Reinhold above all 
others, and it is this one that leads us to the core of Reinhold’s 
problem: the repercussions of the problem of philosophy as a 
problem of language. Hence, the problem was surely, first and 
foremost, in the fact that Kant had not thought of a more 
elementary form of knowledge; but by not doing so, that is, 
by not having referred the faculty of knowledge to a high-
er ground, what that meant to Reinhold was something far 
more important and dangerous, namely, that not only knowl-
edge, but also the language of philosophy was not referred to 
an absolute principle; that is, it too was not absolutely apod-
ictic20 and therefore it was exposed to the most diverse inter-
pretations (the most diverse linguistic inconsistencies), to the 
extent that, according to Reinhold, predicates only pertaining to 
the act of representing were transferred to the cognition of things it-
self. This meant that even amidst an analytical method which 
legitimately progresses from the infinite to the finite, the act 
of cognition tended to excessively subsume the “ ecies” (“Ar-
ten”) under the “genus” (“Gattung”) – but not so due to the 
variability of  ecies, rather due to an insufficient delimitation 
of the genus: after all, the same insufficiency that led to the 
inexistence of a final scientific genus, an ultimate principle 
for the faculty of knowledge (Reinhold, 2003, p. 189-191). 
According to Reinhold, Kant had discerned the latency of the 
genus in the  ecies; but, Reinhold adds, he had failed to follow 
the concept of genus to its last ground – to the absolute prin-
ciple (Reinhold, 2003, p. 187). That is to say: Kant had indeed 
e ablished the concept of causality as the image of a genus 
that precedes  ecies; but he had always stated that this was 
due to the fact that  ecies could never precede the genus, and 
never, as does Reinhold in the Beiträge, 
because reason can only form the concept of 
genus from that which is common to the spe-
cies; but this communitarian element only 
ascends to the condition of consciousness 
when the matter from which the concept of 
species is formed ascends as a whole to the 
condition of consciousness (Reinhold, 2003, 
p. 186). 
Needless to say, the hereby referred “matter” of the con-
cept of  ecies that ascends to consciousness is precisely the 
genus. That is, the ascension (which is followed by the process-
es of composition and dismemberment of concepts, which, in 
turn, alternate amongst themselves from the most composite 
to the least composite, thus dismembering and justifying the 
genus in  ecies) must be preceded by a plane prior to con-
sciousness: and therefore prior to subject and object (Reinhold, 
2003, p. 189); a plane in which one progresses from the least 
composite to the most composite, thus – and only thus – ren-
dering it possible to ascend to consciousness. For, Reinhold 
adds, it is the composition (of the philosophical concept, as 
well as of the whole body of science) that “must precede any 
dismemberment” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 18),21 and justify that 
which is finite. 
And so, in a word, Reinhold concludes that it is the genus 
that precedes any  ecies; but it does not do so as a result of 
any cognitive operation, rather as something absolutely spon-
taneous in the human spirit, an absolutely innate kind of language 
of the human spirit. Which means that, in this theoretical 
frontier between Kant and Reinhold (which, to Reinhold, is 
but one, yet seen from different per ectives), the elevation 
of matter to the condition of consciousness was in Kant only 
partial, due to the inalienable presence of subject and object 
in consciousness, whereas in Reinhold it is total, namely: one 
can only proceed from genus to  ecies, as the first mutual, 
a ive and passive a ion from subject and object. By not con-
sidering the genus in its ultimate grounds, Kant could not 
have attained the concept of representing in general, for the 
genus is, in itself, the concept of representing in general – and 
by not doing so, Reinhold adds, Kant had also left undeter-
mined what rendered the concepts of sensible representation, 
concept and idea a single genus, obedient to a single principle, 
thus inadvertently creating a problem of inconsistency in the 
fundaments of philosophy in general.
Now, the first consequence of this difference in intensity 
of the concept of genus is fairly obvious, namely: Reinhold’s total 
ascension no longer refers to the domain of cognition. For what 
is prior to consciousness (because it is “whole” before being 
dismembered) cannot be referred to the sphere of cognition, 
20 “Da sich der Begriff von Philosophie auf nichts Anschauliches und Empfindbares bezieht: so läβt er sich, wenn er einmal erzeugt ist, 
nur durch Worte festhalten, hervorrufen und andern mitteilen; und er selbst ist in so ferne nichts von dem Sinne der Worte, oder des 
Wortes, womit er bezeichnet wird, Verschiedenes. [...] Dies gilt sogar von allen philosophischen Begriffen und den Bedeutungen ihrer 
Zeichen. Jedes Wort kann in der Philosophie nur einen einzigen bestimmten Begriff bezeichnen, und für die Sprache der Philosophie 
kann es durchaus keine völlig gleichbedeutende Worte geben. Wir haben daher keinen bestimmten Begriff von Philosophie, wenn wir 
keine bestimmte Bedeutung des Wortes aufzuweisen haben” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 16).
21 “Die Zusammenfassung nun, die der Zergliederung vorhergehen und zum Grund liegen muβ, wird bei philosophischen Begriffen 
durchs Denken, bei historischen durchs Empfinden bestimmt” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 18); or “Die Zusammenfassung im philosophischen 
Begriffe wird lediglich durchs Denken bestimmt, und zwar durch ein Denken, welches keine Zergliederung, sondern das Gegenteil von 
derselben ist, und aller Zergliederung vorhergeht” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 18).
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rather is referred to the act of pure representing (Reinhold, 
2003, p. 88-89), a sort of empty container of reason, under-
standing and imagination in their production of ideas, con-
cepts and representations, without which the concepts of sen-
sible representation, concept and idea could not be thought 
– to sum it up, to an elementary philosophy. To Reinhold, the 
act of representing is therefore previous to all cognition, sim-
ply because all cognition is representation, but, conversely, not 
all representation is knowledge.
The second consequence, however, would prove abso-
lutely decisive both to Kant’s upcoming reception and to the 
near future of philosophy in general. It relates to the very 
procedure undertaken in Reinhold’s intensification of the an-
alytical method. For, as was seen, although in the sphere of 
knowledge the concept of genus may only be drawn from the 
 ecies, and hence one such dismemberment must prove the 
veracity of the genus, however, in the sphere of pure repre-
senting it is the  ecies that need orientation from the genus 
regarding their legitimation. This means that the main orien-
tation of Reinhold’s elementary philosophy is retroa ive: it is 
the  ecies that have to return to the genus as an original au-
thority, so as to achieve the perfect identification of the whole 
with itself. Though, in order for this to happen, it is necessary that 
the genus already exists as such; otherwise the  ecies would re-
turn nowhere, rather they would err aimlessly, and the voice 
of the human spirit would reverberate ad infinitum, thus drift-
ing astray. The genus is, therefore, departing point for the  ecies 
– but also their arrival point, and what applies to the particular 
genus and  ecies is also applied to the universal ones, up until the 
final genus: the genus of the absolute principle, through absolute 
circularity, for sure, but also, recalling Fichte, through absolute 
infallibility, free from all acoustic interference from the outside. 
In a word, this means that Reinhold’s radicalization of the 
analytical method was indeed based upon a progression from 
the whole to its parts, and this in such a way that, as if by a 
ripple effect, progression was ultimately determined by a fi-
nal form which not only had to be known from the onset of 
the process, but also forced the process to obey without ever 
overpowering or corrupting it. But what this really means is 
that, if before knowing the  ecies one already has a represen-
tation of the genus, and this applies from the least to the most 
universal in the domain of philosophy, then one such foresight 
must extend all the way to the very essence of philosophy, which 
is expressed in the very act of philosophizing. Hence, if we 
transfer this problem from the simple philosophical proce-
dure to its repercussion in the form of philosophy in general (for, 
to be fair, one is the other, e ecially in a philosophical period 
so keen on philosophizing about philosophy as a whole), then 
– and here lies the core of Reinhold’s problem – all philosophy, 
its own development, its own language could not but reflect this an-
alytical procedure, and therefore they too aimed for the pure prin-
ciple, the pure form of science even before attaining the premises of 
science. Moreover, since “the essential form of philosophy, or 
philosophy itself is not according to its matter, but according 
to its essential form – a product of the human spirit; and in-
deed a product which can never contain anything fortuitous 
or of a casual constitution of the human spirit” (Reinhold, 
2003, p. 22), then this essential form, this absolute genus, this 
first principle had to stay clear of any shade of a doubt, by 
manifesting itself prior to its legitimate constitution, thus being 
spontaneously (in a latent, not a sensible manner) included 
in the circle of science, and that circle in the orbit it itself 
describes in its relation to the  ecies. Hence, and recalling 
Fichte, who is one with Reinhold in this regard, philosophy 
could not rest on a sensible nature (a feeling), rather on a ra-
tional nature (“a thinking”22) – and in this case, not on an ordi-
nary thinking, on an ordinary language, rather on a nature and 
a language generated by the original composition of the essential 
form, prior to the dismemberment inherent to the formation of 
concepts: for 
through dismemberment, only due to insuf-
ficiency or excess do I become conscious 
whether my concept is flawed; and however, 
I only do this in the presupposition that the 
rule according to which I judge these insuffi-
ciency and excess is known prior to the dis-
memberment and is independent from the 
latter (Reinhold, 2003, p. 17).
Hence, to Reinhold, only within a perfect concurrence 
between composition and dismemberment does cognition 
occur, and that perfection implies the most rigorous necessity 
between the parts that constitute the whole (not only with 
regard to its application, but also to the natural and spon-
taneous communication and/or perception of this inverted 
phenomenon by the human spirit). According to him, if all the 
propositions that constitute science may only be legitimated 
in the image of the supreme principle, not through an effort 
of compatibility; if all the  ecies that compose the whole 
proceed towards this supreme authority inasmuch as they 
already existed before they even were what they are, and hence 
they just need to return through the same path that they 
once trudged in order to reach a principle which is begin-
ning and end of all philosophy, then to Reinhold the path of 
philosophy is precisely this circular path which has its beginning 
and end in consciousness itself, as a privileged plane between an el-
ementary philosophy and a philosophy of knowledge. And hence, 
in order to become scientific, philosophy, as any particular 
 ecies before its genus (in this case, the doctrine of the fac-
ulty of representation, or, somewhat later, Fichte’s doctrine 
of science before science) would only have to gravitate around 
this absolute principle of consciousness, thus spontaneously pro-
gressing towards its nearest difference, towards its nearest 
genus and fulfilling its circle.
22 “Der Begriff der Philosophie aber erhält seinen Inhalt aus andern Begriffen, diese wieder aus andern, und immer nur durch ein Denken 
das sich niemals in ein Empfinden auflösen läβt [...]” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 19).
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The question is now evident, and yet no less decisive: 
what results from this transition of philosophy towards its near-
est difference? The answer is given by the very radicalization 
of this method: for if it is the genus’ task not only to manifest 
itself, but to affirm itself prior to the  ecies, so as to retroac-
tively give them a form; and if this happens from the most 
elementary philosophical concept up until philosophy itself, as 
a plane where one such phenomenon happens par excellence, 
then, once the whole is imbued with this spirit, something like 
a chain rea ion must spread from its most insignificant parts 
to its most universal ones, thus culminating, as was Reinhold’s 
aim, in the very idea – a new idea of philosophy. Reinhold’s di-
vergence in relation to Kant attains herein its peak. For in Re-
inhold’s eyes, it was Kant who had promoted this very revolu-
tion in the heart of philosophy. But now the task was to raise 
philosophy above itself and consummate it in its own exteri-
ority, in a principle greater than the whole process. In a word, 
the fact that philosophy should move towards its nearest 
difference meant that philosophy should come to be science; and 
that its history, its language, its individuality of a living organ-
ism should give way to an infallible, scientific whole. Science 
was not just the genus of philosophy, but, to Reinhold, science 
was rather philosophy’s logical destination – just as necessity is 
the inevitable becoming of that fate. Which is why, to Rein-
hold, this fundamental factum should be universally accepted, 
i.e., totally independent from “tempers, chara ers and talents 
of individual men, or of whole nations, climates, governments 
or religious conceptions” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 22)23 and this 
“ha[d] to become clear to all men in all times and under all 
circumstances in which these might reflect about it – through 
pure reflection” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 99).24
These words, which are the result of Reinhold’s long 
reflection on the exteriority of philosophy, have one vital 
consequence. Hence, by going out of its own cocoon of  e-
cies and assuming itself as a genus – by exteriorizing itself – 
philosophy finds itself in a new hybrid position: on the one 
hand, an interior position, on the other hand, an exterior one; 
on the one hand, in its connection to “tempers, chara ers and 
talents of individual men”, as the connecting thread of their 
history and language; on the other hand, in its distance (yet 
not total separation) in relation to these, by dissociating from 
their history and language, but never so much that its own 
new genus-language may not be understood “in all times and 
under all circumstances”. That is, philosophy henceforth had 
a visible attire (as science) as well as an invisible attire (as life); 
for, as science, it should maintain a rather ambivalent connec-
tion towards life, namely, it should draw away from it and, in 
that absence, it should not relate to life but to homogenize it 
in its image (it, the men living in it, the history and language 
that resound from it), thus preventing itself from being con-
taminated by the originally metaphorical nature of human 
language, or by the eternal fallibility of human judgment; and 
yet, in doing so, philosophy cannot but e ablish a quite sin-
gular bond with philosophy, it cannot but be life, and reflect 
on itself as the life it really is. In a word, philosophy thus ex-
empts itself from human existence; but not in such a way that 
it stops ascribing life its meaning, rather in a way that, from 
a higher, external point of view, it gives life, through its own 
language and historical foresight, a new, infallibly defined, sci-
entific course; an inalterable horizon to the history of human 
thought; a steady voice to the language of human philosophy, 
in its own philosophical image. 
Philosophy, one could then say, becomes spontaneous to life 
(and with it, to the human spirit), by drawing away from it – 
even if that meant depriving life from its spontaneity, its a iv-
ity in favor of this purpose. And hence, if it was philosophy’s 
intention to attain absolute spontaneity in the human spirit 
(something which was previously unattainable), this process 
could only be consummated through the perfect conjugation 
of the two privileged forms of philosophical communication 
within the human spirit: the act – under the form of the event, 
of history – and the word – under the form of language, of the 
philosophical concept: which is why, not infrequently, Rein-
hold suggests that only this could mean that philosophy was 
independent from history and comprehensible to all men. Such a 
conjugation could only take place under the sign of a possible 
infallibility of philosophical communication: an infallible sys-
tematic history (for it was a history of philosophy, born with 
this new philosophy) and an infallible, systematic conceptual 
language (for it was purely philosophical, born with this new 
philosophy), both aiming, as if guided by a scientific magne-
tism, at the absolute principle of philosophy and legitimating it 
as much as it legitimates them, thus living in the perfect con-
cord of a reciprocity which, nonetheless, has nothing recipro-
cal about it, rather emanates absolute, infinite unity. 
Finally, this new historiography25 of philosophy meant 
that philosophy should henceforth renounce anything for-
tuitous or hypothetical, historical or circumstantial, but 
also anything remotely human – that is, metaphorical – in 
a language. In a word, philosophy – or rather, philosophers 
23 “Diese Form kann weder durch Temperamente, Charaktere und Talente einzelner Männer, noch ganzer Nationen, noch durch Kli-
mate, Regierungsformen, und Religions-Verfassungen bestimmt sein; welche freilich auf die Entwicklung des menschlichen Geistes, und 
vermittelst derselben auf die frühere oder spätere Existenz der eigentlichen Philosophie, und wenn diese vorhanden ist, auf die nähere 
Bearbeitung und Gebrauch derselben Einfluβ haben, aber welche zu demjenigen, was die wesentliche Form der Philosophie ausmacht, 
durchaus nichts beitragen” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 22).
24 “Dieses Faktum muβ allen Menschen zu allen Zeiten und unter allen Umständen unter welchen sie darüber reflektieren können, durch 
die bloβe Reflexion einleuchten. Es kann also dasselbe in keiner Erfahrung des äuβern Sinnes bestehen, welche sich immer auf individu-
elle Umstände bezieht” (Reinhold, 2003, p. 99).
25 See Fichte (1971, I, p. 77): “Wir sind nicht Gesetzgeber des menschlichen Geistes, sondern seine Historiographen; freilich nicht Zei-
tungsschreiber, sondern pragmatische Geschichtsschreiber”.
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– should renounce the human side of life, thus consigning 
themselves to a philosophy whose history, whose language, 
whose destination was in itself scientific. The time had come 
when philosophy’s chara er of  ecies – which had always been 
philosophy’s condition – was exhausted, thus having to make 
way for philosophy as a genus; which, to Reinhold, required the 
philosopher to identify what had caused that exhaustion; to 
conceive that philosophy, now destitute of life’s a ive media-
tion, should return to its primordia (Reinhold, 2003, p. 228) 
and let itself be transposed to the genus of science. The prob-
lem of philosophy, Reinhold states in Kant’s line of thought, 
is originally a problem of language; up until then a vehicle of 
the history of knowledge, philosophy was henceforth the in-
controvertible vehicle of a language that spoke – and could 
only  eak – about itself, of the rediscovery of a subject who 
only investigated that which was related to himself, a language 
that was what it thought and thought what it was – as such, the 
unavoidable path towards the transition of philosophy to its 
nearest genus. But, above all, this meant the onset of a deeper, 
more complex problem: that of the e ablishment of a new, 
supreme principle of all philosophy and, as such, the final cut 
with a time when philosophy did not yet exist, or was but the 
fruit of a different scythe, the one of the common understand-
ing, or even imagination. Philosophy was now reason.
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